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Abstract: This paper studies the making future claims of security by a large selection of 
experts in D.C.’s think tanks. Although the future is a shared concern on D.C.’s marketplace 
of ideas and in think tanks, as knowledge producers, experts appear as ‘self-blinded’ and 
produce ‘self-blinding prophecies’. This paper studies the language of future claims and the 
role of think tanks in the production of anticipatory knowledge. It discusses how claims about 
the future are prioritised and highlights the focal points around which experts converge. It 
analyses the reasons for such homogeneous thinking lying in the experts’ social profiles, in 
the structure of D.C.’s marketplace and in its norms. The ‘future’ has two major latent func-
tions. On the one hand, past-oriented thinking helps create surprises when political events 
break away from the limited sets of issues studied by experts. On the other, the ‘future’ has 
integrative functions: it serves as a communication tool for experts that gather around shared 
horizons of expectation and create a collective web of meaning.
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This article studies the future claims of a wide range of security experts in a selection 
of think tanks from the Washington DC area. While sociology has mostly discussed 
self-fulfilling prophecies1, this paper sheds light on another function of future claims. 
For both social and epistemic reasons that will appear in this article, as collectives, 
think tanks act as ‘self-blinded’ oracles and produce ‘self-blinding prophecies’.2 I 
argue that future claims are one main dimension of the epistemic limits of the DC’s 
industry of applied knowledge. Indeed, future claims concentrate on focal points 
* This research was funded by Sciences Po’s Scientific Advisory Board as well as by CERI. Some of its initial find-
ings appeared in one of CERI’s working papers series (Selling the Future in DC Marketing Stability for Security, 
Les Etudes du CERI, 2012, n. 184).
1  Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 475–490. Since then, 
this question has been taken over by other sociologists. Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How 
Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006); M. Biggs, ‘Self-Fulfilling Prophecies’, in 
P. Hedström, P. Bearman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). An alternative is also the ‘self-negating prophecy’. For an overview in the context of international 
politics, see:  David Houghton, ‘The Role of Self-Fulfilling and Self-Negating Prophecies in International 
Relations’, International Studies Review, 1(2009), pp. 552–584. This is, of course, an underlying theme in the 
discussion of the ‘security dilemma’ and other perception based social and psychological mechanisms. Robert 
Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167–213.
2  On the blindness of defence intellectuals see B. Kuklick, Blind Oracles Intellectuals and War from Kennan to 
Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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and, as such, contribute to the making of surprises when events break away from 
these pre-established sets of issues and trajectories.3
Future claims have another latent function.4 They act as facilitators of social inte-
gration and are not necessarily about the future. In the interstitial position think tanks 
occupy, future claims’ role is to form a strong bond between different overlapping 
groups, mostly expertise and government.5 As shown in this paper, experts are deep-
ly embedded in the policy world. The ‘future’ is a language and a topic that experts, 
the media and policy makers share and as such, it operates as a potent cement in the 
social fabric of DC and is a web of meaning that brings together experts and their 
audience. In his days, while promoting the use of scenarios and ‘alternative futures’, 
Herman Kahn, one of the most well-known experts at the Rand Corporation and the 
founder of the Hudson Institute in the early 60s, already stressed the importance of 
their ability to “improve intellectual communication and cooperation”.6 Contempo-
rary DC perpetuates this tradition.
The future as a social construction appears as a relevant theme of study in the 
literature on risk and security. Drawing from Foucault, sociologists of international 
relations point at the role anticipations about security threats have as they participate 
in the emergence and consolidation of a ‘governmentality of catastrophe’ and a ‘gov-
ernmental dispositif of risk’.7 Anticipatory claims are one of the features of ‘fields 
of expertise’ or constitutive of social ‘fields’ where mechanisms of habitus prevail.8 
Hence, ideas would be misleading, because knowledge producers are manipulated 
by power. This analysis is shared in the wider community of commentators of inter-
national politics and prevails in Bourdieusian political sociology.
My analysis differs from these various explanatory and normative accounts. The 
purpose of this paper is to highlight the deliberately approximate epistemic status 
and content of security future claims and to explain their social role. Future claims 
are not the expression of think tankers’ surbordination to power. They are a mode of 
existence for think tanks that act as facilitators in the circulation of ideas in DC and 
the integration of its different players, that is, experts and policy makers.9
Although it analyses the production of expertise, the wide political science lit-
erature on think tanks does not specifically discuss the making of future claims.10 
 3 On focal points, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
 4 On manifest and latent functions: Robert Merton, op. cit., pp. 74–94. 
 5  On interstitiality, see: Gil Eyal, L. Buchholz, ‘From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interven-
tions’, Annual Review of Sociology, 36 (2010), pp. 117–137. 
 6  Herman Kahn, ‘The Alternative World Future Approach’, in Morton Kaplan (ed.), New Approaches to Interna-
tional Relations (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1968), p. 84.
 7  See Claudia Aradau, R. van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe Genealogies of the Unknown (London: Rout-
ledge, 2011); Louise Amoore, Marieke de Goede (eds.), Risk and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 
2008).
 8  Didier Bigo et al, The Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007). For a Bourdie-
usian approach in the sociology of international security, see Frédéric Mérand, ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth 
of European Defense’, Security Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2010), pp. 342–374; Didier Bigo, ‘Pierre Bourdieu 
and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power’, International Political Sociology, 5 (4), 
(2011), pp. 225–258; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Bourdieu in International Relations Rethinking Key Concepts in 
IR (London: Routledge, 2012); Ariel Colonomos, Selling the Future. The Perils of Global Predictions (London 
and New York: Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2015).
 9  It is also possible to elaborate an empirically informed normative analysis of future claims. From a normative 
perspective, one of the direct consequences of the sociological analysis I develop in this article is to show the 
conformism of think tanks and analyse its moral consequences. However, normative analysis is not the purpose 
of this article, I develop a normative analysis elsewhere.
10  Among others, see: John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen, The National Origins of Policy Ideas (Princeton: 
European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/201540
Think tanks are often described as operators on a marketplace of ideas.11 However, 
the temporal dimension of their ideas is a question that fails to be addressed. It is 
nonetheless one of the major idiosyncrasies of this epistemic community as it will 
appear in this article and one of its self-proclaimed landmarks.12 This article under-
lines this dimension while, from this angle, developing a better understanding of the 
social role of ideas in DC security circles.
This article also wishes to contribute to the growing literature in the social 
sciences on predictions and scenarios in international politics.13 It complements the 
analyses of future claims by epistemic communities such as nuclear specialists, de-
mographers, rating agencies or international relations experts.14 This article’s goal is 
also to discuss another case of a well structured epistemic community that responds 
to a specific demand of future oriented expertise, to describe how these future claims 
are elaborated and converge as well as to analyse their effects.
The sociological methods I use are both qualitative and quantitative. I have un-
dertaken forty interviews mainly in Washington and in New York, with members of 
leading think tanks and personnel in military academies and governmental agencies 
including intelligence experts.15 The purpose of these interviews was to understand 
the role of those analysts whose manifest function would be to add value to an al-
ready existing body of knowledge while studying their modes of socialisation in 
Princeton University Press, 2014); Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination Think Tanks and the 
Policy Process (London: Frank Cass, 1996); James G. McGann, Kent Weaver (eds.), Think Tanks and Civil 
Societies (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Donald Abelson, A Capitol Idea Think Tanks and 
US Foreign Policy (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); Diane Stone and Andrew Denham 
(eds.), Think Tanks Traditions Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2004); Donald Abelson, American Think tanks and their Role in US Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 
1996); Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012); Andrew Rich, 
Think Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
11  Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination Think Tanks and the Policy Process, op. cit. See ‘Chapter 9: 
Second Hands Dealers in Ideas’, pp.137–151; James G. McGann, Kent Weaver (eds.), op. cit., p. 13; Donald 
Abelson, A Capitol Idea, op. cit. See ‘Chapter 4: Open for Business: Think Tanks and the Marketplace of Ide-
as’, pp. 110–126.
12  On epistemic communities: Peter Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coor-
dination’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1–36.
13  Heikki Patomäki, The Political Economy of Global Security War, Future Crises and Changes in Global Gov-
ernance (London: Routledge, 2008); Chiara De Franco, Christoph Meyer (eds.), Forecasting, Warning, and 
Responding to Transnational Risks (Houndmills: Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); David 
Houghton, ‘The Role of Self-Fulfilling, op. cit.; Ariel Colonomos, Selling the Future, op. cit.
14  Benoît Pelopidas, ‘The Oracles of Proliferation. How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits 
Policy Innovation’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 18 n°1 (March 2011), pp. 297–314;  Hervé Le Bras, ‘L’hor-
oscope des populations’, Vingtième Siècle, 1, Janvier (1984), pp. 75–85; Roundtable, “‘General, I Have Fought 
Just as Many Nuclear Wars as You Have’: Forecasts, Future Scenarios, and the Politics of Armageddon”, The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 117, No. 5 (2012), pp. 1431–1460. Grégoire Mallard and Pierre Pénet, ‘See-
ing Like a Credit Rating Agency: The constitution of Financial Uncertainties During the Greek Sovereign Debt 
Crisis’, in Cooper Hawthorne (ed.), Financial Crises: Identification, Forecasting and Effects on Transition 
Economies (New York: Nova Publishers, 2013), pp. 164–174; Ariel Colonomos, ‘La notation financière des 
Etats’, Communications, 93 (2013); Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005).
15  I undertook fieldwork in Washington (March and May 2011) and New York (2010, 2011 and 2012). Quantita-
tive data has been extracted from the web in August 2011.
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their interstitial role.16 I have used extensive quantitative data,17 as well as inter-
net tools in order to process data available on the web pages of these organisations 
and establish a web mapping and a cartography of these organisations.18 I have also 
worked on reports published by the think tanks and governmental agencies.19
The three major political ruptures of the last decades (the fall of the Berlin wall, 
9/11 and the fall of some of the major Arab regimes) have caught security experts off 
guard.20 Indeed, as a collective, experts expressed views that did not capture these 
turning points and looked at the future in other directions.21 Based on an analysis of 
contemporary security issues, this article explains why experts are ‘self-blinded’, 
that is, why their opinions converge on linear paths and why, therefore, their future 
claims help create surprises when radical changes happen in international politics. 
However, making very approximate future claims does not seem to be a problem in 
DC’s small world as these future claims have an integrative function in DC’s security 
world. In turn, these social integration mechanisms reinforce experts’ blindness as 
they strengthen the homogeneity of this milieu and the biases of its members.
Sections 1 and 2 describe and analyse the formation of future claims. In section 
1, I discuss how the future is formatted in DC’s marketplace of ideas and the pre-
dominant role of the US national interest in future scenarios. Section 2 explores the 
different focal points around which future claims gather and their ‘tunnelling effect’. 
Sections 3 and 4 explain why ideas about the future converge and participate to the 
self-blinding of think tanks experts. While stressing the homogeneity of the experts’ 
community, section 3 explains the formation of these focal points by looking at the 
social profiles of a sample of about 400 think tank analysts. Moreover, as I discuss in 
section 4, DC’s future market for security is structured by solidarism within the think 
tanks’ world that reinforces conformism and the self-blinding mechanism in the face 
of the future. This solidarism is reinforced by groupthink, as, notably, experts face 
important normative pressures when they deliberate over future events.22
16  See annex for the list of these organisations. Among the great number of think tanks that can be found in DC, 
a portion of them has been selected from the ranking list http://www.gotothinktank.com/thinktank/ (the top 
portion); some other organisations that are significant for the purposes of this study have been added, because 
they are relevant as opinion providers about the future of international politics (and therefore security). The 
study on the language they use when they make anticipations (section 1) includes 11 organisations. The study 
on the sites’ content (sections 2) include 8 organisations. The study on the experts’ profile (section 3) includes 
15 organisations. For the sake of clarity and because focal points are determined by the biggest organisations, 
I’ve reduced the number of think tanks in the second section. In section 3, I have used a wider sample in order 
to track possible anomalies in the experts’ profiles. Section 1 looks for what is the experts’ common language 
and does not necessitate a wider sample of organisations.
17  I have worked on quantitative data and statistics based on the ample information available on these organisa-
tions’ websites. Many of them include more than 50,000 pages and in some cases the number is superior to 
100,000. I have collaborated with Sciences Po’s Medialab and Sciences Po’s Map department to process a wide 
collection of these data.
18  In collaboration with the Sciences Po Medialab, I have mostly used Navicrawler data processing programme 
(figure 4) as well as other data processing tools, which show the percentage of pages (figure 1) on these or-
ganizations’ sites where the term searched appears at least once (a Lippmannian device operating as a Google 
scraper, https://wiki.digitalmethods.net/Dmi/ToolLippmannianDevice).
19 I have used the NIC (CIA) report that establishes scenarios for the future (NIC, 2008 and 2013).
20 On 9/11 and the failures of intelligence in think tanks: Donald Abelson, A Capitol Idea, op. cit., p. 209.
21  On turning points, see: Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2001), pp. 240–260.
22 On groupthink, see Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
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Section 1: FRAMING THE FUTURE IN DC’S MARKETPLACE
Think tanks are numerous in the United States, as compared to other parts of the 
world, where for cultural, political, fiscal and legal reasons they play a much less im-
portant role. There are about 1800 think tanks in the United States, nearly 400 in DC 
alone.23 Their role is to provide expertise in the realm of public policy and ‘sell’ their 
ideas. They seek to have their views quoted by policy-makers, statesmen, politicians, 
the military or the media and increase the impact of their views on public policy and 
thereby enhance their credibility and their reputation.
This high concentration of expertise in DC makes it a unique case among the 
different cities and countries where think tanks are based.24 DC characterises itself 
by a very intense level of interaction within the think tanks world and between think 
tankers and practitioners and journalists. Ideas about the future resonate all the more 
in DC, where the future of the world is said to depend upon the decision of US policy 
makers. Future claims are in part a response to collective expectations. Practitioners, 
journalists and scholars who visit DC are looking for signposts of the world’s future 
that they will find both in policy decisions and the comments that are made by think 
tankers.
Futures as intermediate public goods
Future claims are being ‘sold’ in DC’s archetypal marketplace in the field of secu-
rity. When traded on a ‘marketplace’, ideas are shared public goods structured in 
packages.25 In such a marketplace, these centres strive for their reputation and for 
donations. However, these organisations operate within the same environment and 
are also highly cooperative.26 Indeed, as will be shown in the further sections, experts 
share the same paradigms, ideas circulate widely and openly and there is a high de-
gree of solidarity among experts.
Yet, future claims are a specific genre of public goods.27 The two principles that 
define public goods – that is, non rivalry and non excludability – can apply. Indeed, 
as for the former, once research is being published, sharing these ideas is costless. On 
the contrary, it is very important to have one’s own work quoted by colleagues. Their 
non excludable character is more an open question since future claims have both a 
public and private dimension. On the one hand, they are made publicly and appear in 
reports and in the numerous publications that are made available online on these cen-
tres’ websites. On the other, they are also being debated within some of the private 
meetings that think tanks organise. Therefore, future claims are not pure public good.
23  J. McGann, The Global “Go-To Think tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the 
World Final United Nations University Edition, 2011, p. 18. Available at: http://www.gotothinktank.com/glob-
al-%E2%80%9Cgo-to-tanks-leading-public-policy-research-organizations-world/
24  On contrasting knowledge regimes and traditions, see John Cambpell and Ove Pedersen, op. cit. Diane Stone, 
Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett (eds.), Think Tanks across Nations a Comparative Approach (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998).
25  Richard Sparrow, Robert Goodin, ‘The Competition of Ideas: Market or Garden?’, Critical Review of Social 
and Political Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer (2001), p. 48.
26 Donald Abelson, A Capitol Idea, p. 110 and ff.
27  On ideas as public goods, see Alvin Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 203. Future claims are a specific category of ideas that are both public and confidential.
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Think tanks’ ideas about the future show a certain degree of ambivalence for an-
other reason. Although these ideas have a global reach, they are mostly addressed to 
US institutions from a very local perspective and thus could not entirely be defined 
as global goods.28
Future claims in think tanks combine some of the characteristics of global public 
goods and other characteristics of local club goods.29 Indeed, the worthiness of the 
private value of think tankers’ analyses largely depend upon the public reputation of 
their organisation, hence the degree through which their ideas spread and are quoted 
in the media. Overall, these future claims fall into the category of intermediate global 
public goods.30
Futures as conversational topics
As we are reminded by Richard Danzig, chairman of the Board of the Center for a 
New American Security (CNAS), “the inclination to predict is deeply embedded in 
U.S. institutions.”31 By producing future claims, think tanks respond to the demand 
that emanates from these institutions. Indeed, the title of one of the CNAS latest 
annual conferences (2012) – ‘Rethinking US Security: Navigating a World in Tran-
sition’– is very telling of how think tanks frame the future of international security 
and to whom these ideas are addressed and the reasons why they are publicised.32
One of the very distinctive features of the language that its participants make use 
of – that is, the prevalent keywords in their sessions – lies precisely in the future-ori-
ented mode of framing international security. This also very strongly appears in the 
keynote address (‘the Asia Pacific Century’). As it is very often the case, this public 
event gathers members of the host organisation and other think tanks, policy makers, 
retired military, journalists, private consultants, academics. It is also an opportunity 
for its participants to establish connections and networks (this is explicitly stated in 
the programme). As this example clearly shows, future claims have a hybrid status. 
Indeed, think tanks are ranked and strive for social recognition and celebrity. They 
therefore need to build a strong public image, diffuse and share their ideas. How-
ever, think tanks also operate privately and confidentially and deliberately create 
an atmosphere of exclusiveness. In this private space, the access to future oriented 
28  Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Knowledge as Global Public Good’, in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, Marc Stern (eds.), Glob-
al Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford, 1999, pp. 308–325. DC’s 
think tanks are deeply anchored in local traditions. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, op. cit. p. 48.
29  They do not match the characteristics of club goods either as it is very rewarding for think tanks to reach a great 
audience at a global scale notably through the media. James Buchanan, ‘An Economic Theory of Club Goods’, 
Economica, Vol. 32, No. 125, 1965, pp. 1–14.
30  Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, Marc Stern (eds.), op. cit., p. 13. See also Charles P. Kindleberger, ‘International 
Public Goods without International Government’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 1, March, 
(1986), pp. 1–13.
31  The literature on think tanks has not emphasised this idiosyncrasy sufficiently, which makes think tanks in 
DC different from expertise in other countries. Richard Danzig, Dancing in the Dark Ten Propositions About 
Prediction and National Security, Washington DC, Center for a New American Security, October 2011, p. 8. 
Danzig is also a senior analyst at CNAS as well as at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
and other US institutions.
32  http://www.cnas.org/CNAS2012. On foreign policy as the most prestigious domain of research in think tanks: 
Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, op. cit. See Chapter 12, ‘The Foreign Policy Club’.
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analysis about international security is a mark of distinction.33 The ‘future’ is some-
thing secret and only a happy few are entitled to consult the Oracles.34
Whether DC meetings such as these serve as para-diplomacy, as can be seen in 
other parts of the world where think tanks have a relational role in drafting ideas that 
are part of diplomatic processes, is highly questionable.35 DC serves as a hub in the 
global marketplace of ideas in international security and foreign leaders are invited 
to give presentations in the main think tanks in Washington. However these occa-
sions hardly prolong into fast track negotiations or diplomatic agreements. Moreo-
ver, a high degree of insularity prevails despite the fact that there are some attempts 
to internationalise think tanks.36 
These meetings where think tanks open their doors to practitioners and journal-
ists have a primary social function. They are facilitators of a process of socialisation 
where the future is a gathering point for DC’s small world of security. One of the best 
examples of this operative mode is the Council of Foreign Relations, that has in fact 
launched a monthly Contingency Plan Roundtable Series of meetings that are not 
accessible to the wider public. The Center for Preventive Action (CPA), one of the 
CFR’s units, provides at the beginning of each year, a list of scenarios about events 
that might occur over the next 18 months time frame.37 The group that is composed 
of CFR staff and members who mostly come from the US government gathers with 
an informed expert to discuss a possible scenario about the future of a conflict, the 
likelihood of an attack that would hurt US interests or the future of a political regime. 
Although the meetings are private, the scenarios are then made public online.38 An-
other good example is also the work of the National Intelligence Committee (CIA) 
that regularly publishes reports on the future of world politics. The CIA regularly 
gathers experts from think tanks and uses these discussions in the drafting of their 
reports (NIC, 2008 and 2013). This paradox – the willingness to be highly visible 
33 Pierre Bourdieu, La Distinction critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Minuit, 1979).
34  We may however question the fact that the closed seminars they organize provide some information that is 
radically different from the one that is publicly available. Indeed, most of the information processed by experts 
is open access.
35  Security centres and transnational epistemic communities may facilitate unofficial policy dialogues. David 
Capie and Brendan Taylor, ‘The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionnalization of Defence Diplomacy’, 
The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, (2010), pp. 359–376. Experts can play a role within epistemic communi-
ties that include governmental officials and NGOs in Track II diplomacy. Sheldon Simon, ‘Evaluating Track 
II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific: the CSCAP Experience’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 
15, No. 2 (2002), pp. 167–200. However, even in contexts where those dialogues exist, we see an inability 
of think tankers to rise above the views of their national governments. See Amitav Acharya, ‘Engagement or 
Entrapment? Scholarship and Policymaking on Asian Regionalism’, International Studies Review, 13 (2011), 
pp. 12–17. As it will be shown further, this is most extreme in the case of experts in DC. Non-American think 
tanks seem to be more willing to adopt a global and diversified approach to the framing of their research. Al-
though, even in this case, the globalisation of think tanks may have been part of a set of expectations that pre-
vailed in the late 90s and in the early 2000s about the role of non-state actors in international politics and that 
have, in part, remained unfulfilled. Diane Stone, ‘The ‘Policy Research’ Knowledge Elite and Global Policy 
Processes’, in Daphné Josselin, William Wallace (eds.), Non-State Actors in World Politics (London, Palgrave, 
2001), pp. 113–132.
36  Some US think tanks have affiliates in other countries. See Stone and Denham, op. cit., p. 48. Some of these 
centres have contacts with foreign institutions as is, for example, the case of the Center for Transatlantic Rela-
tions that has partnerships with various German foundations. http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu 
37 http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/cpa/index.html
38  http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/center-for-preventive-action-contingency-roundtable-series/pr1412#publi-
cations 
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and also preserve a degree of confidentiality – is well expressed in the ‘Chatham 
House rule’ that many think tanks are proud to apply.39
Publicly and privately, the future is both a space of discussion that brings togeth-
er members of DC’s security world, think tanks being key players and most often the 
hosts of these events. The future is both a communicative tool and a conversational 
topic. To a certain extent, think tanks are comparable to a ‘gentleman’s clubs’ where, 
in 19th century England, betting (therefore making future claims) was one of the 
main activities of their members.40
Semantic, epistemic and strategic divisions of labour in future telling
In the think tanks’ community, the future appears to be a mode of establishing one’s 
identity, notably vis-à-vis the academic world.41 As we are told by one of your in-
terviewees, academics mostly study the past42, as, for example, their preference for 
issues such as the First World War would illustrate.43 This expert followed by saying 
that there was initially in the discipline of international relations a reluctance to 
study novel issues that look at how future events unfold, such as private military 
companies or child soldiers. Ultimately, according to his view, these became part of 
the academic discussion, but researchers in think tanks initiated and pushed the de-
bate significantly further because they were given more freedom to investigate new 
global challenges. Experts are eager to differentiate themselves from old-fashioned 
academics and adopt the future as an ethos that is meant to signal modernity. The 
preference for the future in think tanks also signals action over passivity.44
The ‘future’ operates as a label within the DC security world. It is indeed one of 
most used terminologies on the think tanks’ websites. At Brookings, the term future 
appears on 37,900 pages. It shows on 34,200 pages at NAF, or 18,400 at the CFR. 
39  Accordingly, participants to a meeting are free to use the information received (during a meeting at the think 
tank), but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker, nor that of any other participant may be re-
vealed.
40  P. Rhode, K. Stumpf, ‘Historical Political Futures Markets: An International Perspective’, NBER Working 
Paper, No. 14377 (2008), p. 4. It is also worthwhile noting that the Chatham House rule was established in 
London. CFR membership is by invitation only. Chatham house served as a model for the CFR when it was 
founded.
41  Think tankers often see academic scholars as too disconnected from reality. A future oriented approach clearly 
signals their interest in policy relevant issues. John Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen, op. cit., pp. 57–59.
42  This view leaves aside an important debate within the international relations community about whether schol-
ars of the field should focus on the past, the present or, eventually, the future. On the one hand, a majority of 
scholars would agree that the discipline of international relations focuses essentially on the past. See Alexander 
Wendt, ‘Driving with the Rearview Mirror: on the Rational Science of Institutional Design’, International Or-
ganization, Vol. 55, No. 4 (2001), p. 1022. Moreover, working on contemporary issues presupposes that these 
events have already occurred and that they are already past. On the other hand, albeit it is a difficult task, few 
specialists make the case that international relations can and or should establish scenarios. Steven Bernstein, 
Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, S. Weber, ‘God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Sciences 
to an Unpredictable World’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 43 (2000), pp. 43–76. 
Heikki Patomäki, op. cit. Even fewer would say that social sciences should establish predictions.  Bruce Bueno 
de Mesquita, Predicting Politics (Athens: Ohio State University Press, 2002). Some historians would also un-
derline that IR is future-oriented because its specialists have faced a social demand from outside this emerging 
discipline by those who have wanted to know about the future of war and peace. John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Inter-
national Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1992/1993), 
pp. 5–58.
43  This fact (the role of the study of the First World War in IR scholarship) is not inconsistent. The conclusions 
drawn from these premises are less convincing.
44 As we will see in the further section, these lines of divide are highly questionable.
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Other data coming from Google scraping show that, on average, the word appears, in 
the fifteen organisations I have investigated, on more than thirty per cent of the total 
number of pages of their sites.45 The Hudson Institute perpetuates the tradition set by 
its founder: ‘future’ appears on nearly 60 per cent of its webpages.46
Figure 1
Although ‘future’ is the prominent and generic label that signals future telling, there 
are different categories of future claims. Epistemically, we can dissociate at least two 
analytical models.47 A prediction is understood as an act of stating beforehand the 
coming of a specific event or an identified outcome. It can be conditional and also 
be expressed in probabilistic terms. Mathematical models or predictive markets are 
used to make predictions, notably in the field of international security.48 Bruce Bueno 
de Mesquita does consulting with security agencies. As for predictive markets, the 
Pentagon announced in 2003 that it wanted to launch a prediction market on the 
future of security that, among other things would have indicated the likelihood of a 
future terrorist attack.49 However, think tanks do not favour predictive markets for 
reasons that will be discussed below.50
A forecast is an anticipation of a course of action. It can be expressed in proba-
bilistic terms of the occurrence of an event that is conditioned by other events that 
are also valued in probabilistic terms. If event A occurs (probabilities for it to occur 
are ‘x’), then C will occur (probabilities, in this context, for C to occur are ‘y’), the 
overall probability for C to occur is ‘z’ (‘x*y’).51 Depending on the different options 
created by the probabilities, a forecast might include different scenarios that rely on 
‘plots’ and include ‘wild cards’.52
These epistemic differences are worthwhile noting. However, in practice, the 
line between predictions and scenarios is considerably blurred. The future is an inter-
mediate public goal whose production requires craftsmanship. As craftsmen, think 
45 For a list of these organisations, see Annex.
46  This tag cloud indicates the percentage of the use of keywords within the different websites (the percentage of 
the pages where the term appears).
47  On the epistemology of future claims, see: Nicolas Rescher, Predicting the Future: An Introduction to the 
Theory of Forecasting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). Gregor Betz, Prediction or Proph-
ecy? The Boundaries of Economic Foreknowledge and their Socio-Political Consequences (Wiesbaden: DUV, 
2006).
48  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, op. cit.; J. Wolfers, E. Zitzewitz, ‘Prediction markets’, Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 18 (2004), pp. 107–126.
49  The FutureMap project was developed by The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The 
Congress blocked this initiative. However, IARPA (Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency at the 
Pentagon) has launched a new experiment. Its first step was to assess the value of predictive markets as reliable 
predictive tools in policy (formerly at http://forecastwe.org/) . It is now in its third phase, the good judgment 
project, where new experiments are carried out, see http://www.goodjudgmentproject.com.
50  Rand is experimenting with its own predictive markets, but it is internal to the organisation, therefore looses 
its meaning as future markets are designed to aggregate diverse opinions and mitigate the biases of shared 
mindsets.
51  J. Freeman, B. Job, ‘Scientific Forecasts and Predictions: Problems of Definition and Epistemology’, Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1979), pp. 113–143.
52 Steven Bernstein et al, op. cit.
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tankers assemble different forms of knowledge in order to make their product attrac-
tive primarily in the small world they live and eventually beyond DC and the US. A 
forecast might include multiple scenarios and a time range, within which this event 
is likely to occur. When think tankers make future claims, these two modes, predic-
tions and scenarios, overlap. Indeed, forecasts often include predictions as elements 
of the more comprehensive forecast.
Mostly for strategic rhetorical reasons that differ from epistemic concerns, ex-
perts do not favour the use of the term ‘prediction’. Among the different terms that 
can be used to refer to future events, it is ranked very low. In relative terms, it ap-
pears the most frequently on the New America Foundation website (2.3 per cent) or 
the Rand Corporation (2 per cent). As opposed to predictions, experts usually make 
scenarios, a term that is much more significantly used on their sites.53 A scenario 
is essentially a ‘story’ where two temporal points are bridged by the analysis of a 
chain of events whose plausibility ought to be tested. It is a qualitative analysis of 
social interactions, as in the scenarios elaborated during the CFR’s Contingency Plan 
Roundtable series of meetings.
Moreover, there are strong reasons for members of think tanks to favour scenari-
os over predictions. As predictions are more and more elaborated through the use of 
mathematical models or predictive markets, if these tools were to become predomi-
nant, this would seriously harm experts whose social role runs the risk of becoming 
obsolete.
Scenarios operate as magnets that attract converging views in the public arena 
created by the collaborative efforts of think tanks and the media. As in the forma-
tion of knowledge from a Kuhnian perspective, scenarios about the future aggregate 
around ‘normal science’.54 The structure of scenarios is cumulative; every future tell-
er adds his or her findings to its initial core. Experts are similar to the flies depicted 
by Popper who assemble in clouds, they meet and converge around a question while 
adding their share to an initial debate.55 They respond to a social demand that calls 
for intrigue solving where pessimism and the logic of fear are usually prevalent.56
The national interest as a plot
When they make claims about the future, experts usually develop scenarios that fol-
low two narrative rules. As a starting point, these stories are to be told because they 
are part of what is believed to be a domain of high importance for the ‘US national 
interest’. Then, as these narratives unfold, they are based on trends.57 They start with 
what is perceived as the current state of affairs and then extend them to the horizon, 
to which it is anticipated the forces at play will lead.
53  It appears on more than 8 per cent of the pages of the Hudson Institute or on 7 per cent of the pages of the 
Carnegie website.
54 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962).
55 Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
56  Risk is the only other temporal category that think tanks use significantly in their vocabulary. It appears on 
average on twelve per cent of their websites. ‘Risk’ is a more contextual category recurrently used in the study 
of terrorism and the Arab and Muslim world, which is one of prevailing areas of research of think tanks in DC.
57  See for example Global Trends, NIC’s reports at 2025 or 2030 (NIC, 2008 and 2013), which gather the work 
of many experts from DC.
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In the framing of these scenarios, the national interest operates as a unitary plot.58 
Indeed, thinking outside the box of the national interest, is a rare phenomenon.59 This 
preference for the national interest as a plot orients the different future claims and, for 
both political and epistemic reasons, it operates as a blinker. Although this concept 
is widely used, implicitly and explicitly, there are very few instances where the con-
ceptual framework upon which the use of this notion is grounded is explained. The 
national interest belongs to the culture of Realism, both as a social science paradigm 
and as a mode of foreign policy (Realpolitik). However, there are no indications of 
what its constitutive elements consist. Moreover, as the future of the US is important, 
the future of the national interest should also matter. In order to make significant 
future claims that would have strong informational value, think tanks would need to 
inform their public about what would be the definition of the US national interest in 
the future.60 However, this question remains ignored. The national interest operates 
mainly as a filter when discriminating between the security issues that would be of 
concern for the think tanks and reduces the informational value of the future claim. 
This plot is a common grammar members of the expertise community and their in-
terlocutors share and which reinforces their sense of belonging to DC’s small world.
Moreover, the future as intermediate public goods is attractive in the global me-
dia, as it also informs about what the US national interest is believed to be in the 
US. Foreign journalists mingle with security experts and are invited to some of their 
meetings and use this information in their reports on US foreign policy. This foreign 
demand has a retroactive effect. It reinforces the circularity of DC’s expertise that 
is also constructed from the outside and validates for think tankers the need to set a 
vision for the future of their country and, ultimately, for the future of world politics.
Section 2: FOCAL POINTS AND TUNNELLING EFFECTS
Experts speak the same language and prioritise security issues according to very 
similar criteria. They are constrained by the needs of the policy organisations to 
which their studies are addressed and on the rules established by other institutions 
that fund their activities. As in the case of the CFR or when experts meet and work on 
NIC Global Trends, these institutions mostly favour qualitative scenarios on specific 
regions of the world that are said to be relevant for the US and its national interest.
Scenarios are forecasting tools that echo the scientific tradition of the Delphi 
method established after the Second World War at the Rand when the US Air Force 
inquired about the future uses of technology in warfare. The Delphi method’s pur-
pose is to find a consensus by iteration within a group that deliberates about future 
events.61 In think tanks, the social practice of future-oriented working seminars that 
58 Bernstein, op. cit.
59  I have never heard from the different experts that I have interviewed that the issues they were investigating 
need not be prioritised. Data from Google scraping is consistent with this observation. Keywords that would 
signal the preference for different epistemic and political worlds such as for example ‘multilateral’ appear 
marginally on the think tanks’ websites. Among the different organisations, SAIS is the organisation where this 
term is more referenced: it appears on 2.5% of its pages (it is virtually inexistent on most of the other websites).
60  On the futurity of the concept of national interest: Stephen G. Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, International Or-
ganization, Vol. 51, No. 3, (1997), pp. 445–477.
61  Norman Dalkey, ‘The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion’, US Air Force Rand, 1969. 
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produce collective intelligence62 has perpetuated itself while contributing to the so-
cialisation of expertise and to the social integration of experts and policy makers.63
The focal points that we see (figure 2 and 3) are the result of a double process 
of tunnelling. Indeed, within the think tanks future claims are often the byproduct 
of consensus searching. Themes and countries are prioritised and scenarios also re-
flect common paradigms and horizons of expectations. Moreover, on the DC mar-
ketplace, future claims are not dispersed, since, as one of our interviewees pointed 
out, ‘running after the ball’ is one of DC’s favourite social activities. As one topic 
emerges in the public sphere, experts from the different organisations are bound to 
produce comments and engage in future telling. There are many examples of this 
phenomenon, the case of Iran’s nuclearisation being one of them. This scenario that 
calls for different policy responses (the dilemma of intervention) has been prevalent 
in the think tanks’ world for more than ten years.
Figure 2
These data show the great homogeneity of the social milieu of think tanks whose 
members share the same epistemic and political interests. The the lows and the peaks 
are very similar (figure 2).64 The most referenced countries are China and Russia. 
As a regional area, the European Union is clearly not a priority. Using other data, 
on average, ‘Russia’ appears on 16 per cent of the webpages of these organisations, 
a score very comparable to that of ‘Iran’ (15.8 per cent), ‘Iraq’ was in 2011 a much 
greater concern and showed on 45 per cent of the webpages.
Except for the CFR, Brazil, a country of significant importance in contemporary 
international relations, is clearly neglected.65 Not taking into account Brazil is also 
very telling of the kind of paradigms still en vogue in international politics. As a 
military conflict with that country is very unlikely to happen and as its emergence 
as a new power in international politics is relatively recent, think tanks’ literature 
on Brazil is scarce and anecdotal. This is also very symptomatic of the difficulty for 
experts to renew their workplace and change the lenses through which they look at 
the world (see section 3).
Occasionally, Rand still uses Delphi.
62  James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective 
Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations (New York: Doubleday, 2004).
63  These meetings differ from the explicit Delphi methodology, since the responses to initial questions are not 
anonymous, however the focus on collective intelligence of expertise is similar.
64 In grey, the number of hits that fall beyond the average within each organisation.
65  See the CFR’s initiative on Brazil: http://www.cfr.org/brazil/global-brazil-us-brazil-relations/p25407?co 
=C007303. There is also a lack of expertise on Brazil in the academic field of international studies.
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Shared horizons of expectation66
These organisations are betting on very similar horses. China is one of the most if not 
the most important issues they want to investigate when thinking about the future. 
This shows when we searched the number of pages of those referenced organisations 
on figure 2 where the terms ‘future’ and ‘China’ would appear simultaneously. This 
preference reflects a strong interest for big countries likely to be competitors of the 
US and a very traditional vision of international politics, where the most important 
issues are war and peace. 
Figure 3
This map (figure 3) aggregates data from the same organisations we find on figure 2. 
It includes the number of entries of the term future associated with a regional area. 
As such, it is a reflection of what are for those organisations those regions that are 
most important for the future. What primarily emerges is a teleological and tragic 
vision of the world, where the US struggles with its main competitors. On this map, 
we clearly see the relevance of three large entities: the US, the Middle East and 
Asia. Such preference coincides with two most prevalent paradigms in post-Second 
World War international relations. Firstly, it is an interpretation of what a US policy 
vaguely defined in terms of national interest should be, that is, to stand firm vis-à-vis 
its competitors (balance of power), in this case confronting the threat of Islam and 
the new rise of Asia and more specifically the power of China. It is also a picture of 
world that is driven by the rise and fall of civilisations as we find here a reflection of 
Huntington’s Islamic-Confucian alliance.67
66  Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past on the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004).
67 Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993), pp. 45–47.
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Section 3: A SELF-BLINDED COMMUNITY
Security experts in think tanks form a dense and integrated epistemic community. 
The cement of this community is both social and epistemic and the future is one 
of its most important structural features that binds together its members. However, 
although the future is of great concern for these analysts, their thinking is grounded 
on very traditional frameworks and, unlike what is often claimed, their expertise is 
also plagued by inertia.
This section will highlight the lack of diversity that characterises the milieu of 
expertise in DC, which is one of the major factors explaining the tunnelling effect 
that hampers the think tanks’ production of knowledge and creates blindness. In-
deed, not only can diversity reflect in a plurality of centres of interests, but it produc-
es results that are epistemically more robust than those reached by groups that are 
culturally and socially more homogenous, especially in the case of future-oriented 
analysis.68 This is not something about which think tanks are unaware, however they 
have not made any significant attempts to mitigate the effects of this bias.
Past-centred social and epistemic identities
Experts whose primary domain of research is said to be ‘defence and security’ form 
a large majority that outnumbers the experts who work primarily on all geographical 
areas combined.69 ‘Defence and security’ is the meta-narrative of this small world. 
The think tank world reflects the Cold War dominance of ‘hard issues’ where alter-
native views or ‘soft’ issues are clearly not well represented. For example, although 
it has become a fashionable concept at the UN and in some academic circles, the 
concept of ‘human security’ is definitely not very prominent in this small world.
It does not come as a surprise that the number of experts who specialise in re-
gional areas and large countries, is primarily concerned with the Middle East and 
Russia.70 This reflects US foreign policy and the priorities for the US over the last 
decades. As for the Soviet Union, this area is, in Koselleckian terms, a ‘space of ex-
perience’ (a moment in time that has become a model for action and future-oriented 
action). History becomes a model for learning and for the making of future claims 
(Historia Magistra Vitae as Koselleck points out). This rear view mode of thinking 
is consistent with classical Realism and also with the teaching experts have received 
in the schools of international practice they attended, notably in the 1970s and the 
1980s.71 The number of experts on Russia is rather high, as compared to the number 
68  Miriam Solomon, ‘Groupthink versus The Wisdom of Crowds the Social Epistemology of Deliberation’, 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (2006), pp. 28–45; Carl Sunstein, ‘Deliberating Groups 
versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to Habermas)’, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemol-
ogy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2006), pp. 192–213; Philip Tetlock, op. cit.; Philip Tetlock,, Barbara Mellers, ‘Intelligent 
Management of Intelligence Agencies Beyond Accountability Ping-Pong’, American Psychologist, 6 (2011), 
pp. 542–554.
69  The data used in this section is based on the profiles of 398 researchers working in those organisations, as it 
appears in the curriculum vitae on their webpage. It is also a reflection of how the analysts want to be perceived 
by the policy world and the media. Among these 398 experts, 106 primary research theme is ‘defence and 
security’.
70 Among our sample, we find 43 experts on the Middle East and 16 on Russia (and Eurasia).
71  In the case of Harvard where many of these analysts are trained, see Richard E. Neustadt, Ernest May, Thinking 
in Time – The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). The authors emphasise 
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of experts on countries of similar importance such as India or Brazil. This testifies 
to the legacy of the Cold War and shows the inertia of those institutions and the 
challenge they face when it comes to adapting to change. Many experts on the for-
mer USSR followed the ‘transition’ and, since then, have specialised in post-Soviet 
Russian society.
Another variable which explains why this vision leaves aside important areas of 
the world and novel issues is the circular chain of production of ideas of which think 
tanks are part. Some major think tanks partly rely on funding made available by very 
large foundations. These corporate foundations (where experts frequently consult) 
speak the same language that both experts and policy makers use and share the same 
keywords. Some think tanks also receive funding from governmental agencies and 
through grants. In some cases, there is a time span of several years between the mo-
ment when a decision on a theme of research is made within the donor bodies and 
the moment when the think tank delivers its work. This accounts for the inertia of 
expertise.
The logic of politics and the policy world are a backward-oriented driving force. 
Leaders have their own vision of the world, rooted in their past. Their experience ori-
ents their thinking on what are the most important current issues of the world. They 
are also caught in another temporal chain. Defining what those key issues are also 
depends on past events such as a war or a terrorist attack, that are of great concern 
to their constituents.
One point should be stressed: although China is of great concern to think tanks 
and is widely discussed, notably from a future-oriented perspective (see section 2), 
the number of China specialists is rather low. Among those 398 senior experts, we 
find 31 Asia specialists out of which only 6 of them rank China as their primary area 
of expertise. This is due to the fact that think tanks are constrained by the same in-
ertia that prevails in academia and that it takes a long time to renew a generation of 
scholars and build up a field. Surprises are then all the more likely to appear when 
focusing on a theme without having done thorough research.
Although some organisations are older than others and, as in the case of CFR 
for example, may have a more authoritative voice in future telling, the trajectories 
of their members are similar in a world which is extremely fluid and where profes-
sionals move easily from one think tank to another. The homogeneity of this social 
milieu is also the reflection of the education and the training these professionals have 
received (figure 4).
the need of “how to use experience” (foreword, xxii).
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Figure 4
Although these experts have strong academic credentials, they have made the choice 
of a policy world considered to be more vibrant than what is often seen as a more 
subdued career in academia. A signifi cant number of those professionals have a PhD. 
This is particularly the case for the younger generation. Very few analysts are non-
American. A few of them are Europeans and, occasionally, think tanks hire experts 
from the Arab world, China, India or Pakistan, if they have received basic training 
in the US. Some experts have studied at prestigious universities in the UK such as 
Oxford. The training that they received there (the topics on which they have focused 
and the paradigms they have learned) does not signifi cantly differ from those of 
American universities.72 Over a time span of thirty years, their Realist approach and 
their Huntingtonian world vision (section 2) are a good refl ection of the academic 
training they have received.
Closed circuits
Ideas widely circulate between the different organisations as it shows on this map 
that illustrates the links on the web between the different organisations and the den-
sity of their interconnections (fi gure 5).73 The map also shows what are the common 
72  It will be interesting to see how other more contemporary forms of knowledge such as constructivism, comput-
er sciences or global history will translate into the interstitial spaces of expertise in 10, 20 or 50 years and how 
major events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11 and the current changes in the Arab world will refl ect 
in their thinking. It will also be interesting to see how the feminisation of IR studies will affect think tanks as 
their members are today primarily males.
73  Two think tanks are missing from this fi gure, the CFR and Brookings. Their websites are protected against data 
processing internet tools.
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nodes these sites share, that is, the same websites where one of the web pages of two 
or more websites can lead to (their one degree of separation).
Figure 5
The social and political worlds of DC’s think tanks are fairly insular and cohesive. 
While think tanks compete for the access to the public sphere, there is a certain 
degree of homogeneity in the content of the websites. This also shows that most 
of these professionals attend events that are organised by their peers and therefore 
participate in the creation of the community as such.
As we can see from this fi gure, the left part is more dense that the right one. This 
left part (ironically) includes the more conservative of these organisations, notably 
the Hudson Institute, the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the American 
Enterprise Institute. On the right side, the only conservative think tank is the Lexing-
ton Institute. The density of the links within the conservative group of organisations 
on the left side can be explained by the fact that these organisations feel the need 
to ‘stick together’. Conservative organisations seem to feel threatened by what they 
perceive to be an intellectual environment favourable to liberal ideas. These organ-
isations have solid ties to other centres that share their conservative views (both 
politically and economically), such as, for example, the Mercatus Center or the Ca-
tounbound website.
This graph (fi gure 5) illustrates the role of the media in the fl ow of this circulation 
of ideas. Think tanks are connected to several online media such as The Washington 
Times, The Huffi ngton Post, ABC, Forbes or CNN. With the exception of George 
Washington University, we see no other entrepreneurs of ideas on this map (such 
as NGOs, other academic institutions or non-American think tanks). The media are 
the only other actors that are virtually signifi cantly connected with the think tanks’ 
world. This shows how ideas are diffused in closed circuits and how they reverberate 
from one think tank to the other through the media.74 This graph validates some more 
qualitative analyses on the collaboration between think tanks. Indeed, think tankers 
often move from one organisation to the other and remain in close contact with their 
former colleagues with whom they share their ideas. Although what is predominant 
is the high degree of interconnectivity between think tanks, this graph also shows 
that there are some bridges between experts and the media. The relative absence of 
academia on the map shows the relative divide between the two worlds and the com-
petition between think tankers and scholars although, individually, some professors 
might be affi liated to think tanks and experts teach as adjuncts in major universities, 
notably in DC.
74  When, individually, they want to communicate with the outside world, many of these experts have a twitter 
account. Its reference appears on their webpage and therefore shows on the graph.
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Figure 6
This map (fi gure 6) brings further evidence that testifi es to the uniformity of this 
social milieu. It shows the extent to which these centres of expertise are embedded 
with governmental offi ces and political institutions as well as universities, and that 
the media is a true social and geographical reality.
Think tanks’ experts are, indeed, deeply embedded with the policy world. A ma-
jority of these analysts – sixty percent – have political and governmental experience, 
the kind of trajectory sought by their younger colleagues. The State Department and 
the Pentagon have been their primary affi liations. Some are retired diplomats and 
military offi cers. In addition to working at a think-tank a number of them also hold 
teaching positions, in most cases as adjunct professors and in some cases as perma-
nent faculty.75
Think tanks form a dense and integrated community tightly linked to its urban 
environment. It is not just selected opinions and projects that their members share. 
As the data about their education and their socialisation (fi gures 4 and 6) as well the 
virtual mapping of their social existence on the web (fi gure 5) testify, they are part 
of a collective ‘web of meaning’. The topics they focus on are homogeneous (fi gure 
2 and 3), their ideas circulate in closed circuits. The cultural and social homogeneity 
75  A great number of these professors teach at Georgetown, which has a longstanding tradition in the training of 
young diplomats.
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of this milieu reflects well the directions the members of this community look at and 
the futures to which they point.
Section 4: FUTUROLOGISTS’ SOLIDARISM AND GROUPTHINK76
As intermediate public goods, future claims are highly visible and are the landmarks 
of expertise. However, although experts refer to scientific methods in their work, 
these future claims are hardly subject to the scrutiny of the members of the DC com-
munity. Indeed, there are no peer review mechanisms or similar tools that would dis-
criminate and improve the epistemic quality of these claims about the future of world 
politics. Other than from practitioners, the media is the only social world with which 
think tanks are in direct contact. Journalists very rarely criticise experts’ opinion. 
They would lack the legitimacy to offer counter-arguments. Moreover, the media 
need experts in order to build the news. Finally, the methodology used by experts is 
also hardly questioned and they are rarely in competition with other techniques of 
forecasting.
We find two greater social dynamics that account for think tanks’ uniformity that 
narrows their vision of the future. One is external, the other one internal. Although 
my work focuses on the latter, it is important to note that those who make claims 
about the future, in order to be heard, have to meet their interlocutors’ expectations, 
that is, the specific governmental agencies or private companies that fund their activ-
ities. As appears in several interviews, experts have a sense of what visions of the fu-
ture are likely to be accepted on the market: those futures generally imply decisions 
that are not too costly for policymakers. It will be very difficult for an expert to bring 
into the public policy discussion an idea the implementation of which would require 
a costly shift from actual policy. Accordingly, in the leading think tanks, radicalism 
is also clearly not the best way to make oneself heard. Extreme-right or extreme-left 
ideas are very scarce if not altogether absent.77
Mostly from an internalist perspective, we have to take into account two potent 
vectors of uniformisation that strongly affect the claims about the future experts in 
think tanks regularly produce: the structure of the marketplace itself and the norma-
tive pressure that exerts on the experts.
Solidarism on the marketplace
DC’s entrepreneurs are competitive vis-à-vis the outgroup (notably academia and 
predictive markets), however they express solidarity vis-à-vis their peers within the 
ingroup. Indeed, it is rare to see an expert being outcast by his peers for the errors 
76  Futurologist is a terminology that was coined in the 1960s. Rand was involved in the process of bringing futur-
ology’s expertise in the policy arena as well as in the public debate. See Nicolas Rescher, op. cit. Experts about 
the future developed scientific methods based on game theory and computer science. Herman Kahn, Bertrand 
de Jouvenel or Alvin Toffler became gurus that were or still are well known to the general public.
77  Some experts can have overtly conservative views, but would not express racist views. If so, they would face 
the risk of being ousted by their community.
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he or she would have made. This appears to be all the more true in the case of future 
claims.
First, as scenarios are the most current mode of future telling, this helps to pro-
tect experts from the risk of reputational sanction.78 It remains difficult to qualify a 
scenario as ‘wrong’. These narratives are always judged in relative and qualitative 
terms, whereas ruling over a prediction would be more definitive.
Although truth would not be the criterion upon which they would be judged, 
scenarios could however be the subject of some normative assessment. Truthfulness 
would be appropriate in this case. Truthfulness presupposes sincerity, the search for 
the truth and the use true and objective elements that would support one’s analyses 
or deeds.79 Moreover, truthfulness presupposes that one’s cognitive capabilities are 
fit for the task one desires to perform.
Let us go back to the case of China. One must underline that ‘rise of China’ has 
been for ten years the most searched ‘story’ in the media.80. As we have seen in sec-
tion 2, think tanks echo this concern and the assumption that China will continue to 
rise is also prevalent.81 They are pushed by this social demand and contribute to this 
debate. However, as a collective, think tanks clearly lack truthfulness when future 
claims about China are being produced, as so few experts are trained in this area. 
This fact does not seem to be problematic in DC’s small world of expertise: from 
within the think tanks’ world, we hear no criticism of the quality of China studies.
Think tanks hardly face any significant criticism from the policy world either. 
The DC’s marketplace is indeed based upon a dialogal form of ‘connivance’.82 As 
some of the most important events of these last ten years testify, DC is a good ex-
ample of the shortcomings of such a marketplace.83 More specifically, it is a typical 
example of a ‘Low Low’ game, where experts ‘pretend to know’ (while they are 
aware that those to whom these ideas addressed know about the low quality of their 
outcomes) and practitioners ‘pretend to listen’ (as if they would change their behav-
iour based on the information that is provided).84
78  Intellectuals are very seldom sanctioned for making ‘silly predictions’. See Gil Eyal, L. Buchholz, ‘From the 
Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions’, Annual Review of Sociology, 36 (2010), pp. 117–
137.
79  Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness an Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002).
80  According to the Language Monitor, “rise of China” this has been the case for the last ten years (the sample 
includes 50.000 media in the world, both on paper and on the internet). See http://www.languagemonitor.
com/predictive-quantities-indicator/bin-ladens-death-one-of-top-news-stories-of-21th-century/ (last accessed, 
January 23rd 2013. See also M. Beckley, ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure’, International 
Security, 36, 3 (2011/2), p. 41.
81  There are three main possible narratives about the future of China. The first and prevailing one is pessimistic: it 
tells that China is the peer competitor to the US and that it constitutes a threat to US hegemony and its interest. 
The second considers that, although China will rise, the US will still prevail. The third states that China’s rise 
is an opportunity to develop trade relations and therefore can be beneficial to US interest.
82 Bertrand Badie, Diplomacy of Connivance (New York: Palgrave, 2012).
83  Charles Kaufman, ‘Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas the Selling of Iraq War’, 
International Organization, Vol. 29 No. 1 (2004), pp. 5–48. Originally, in the liberal tradition set by John S. 
Mill, the term ‘marketplace of ideas’ was introduced to characterise the virtues of liberal public spaces where 
freedom was the necessary condition for the optimisation of knowledge and the production of truth. Sparrow 
and Goodin, op. cit., p.45. 
84  Diego Gambetta, Gloria Origgi, ‘The LL game: The Curious Preference for Low Quality and Its Norms’, 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2013), pp. 3–23. When they analyse this game of false 
pretences, Gambetta and Origgi consider that this low quality exchange is sustained by ‘cartels of mutually 
satisfied mediocrities’. Socially and epistemically, this is true in the think tanks arena and in the policy world.
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Let us examine one individual case. Kenneth Pollack – a well-known specialist 
of the Middle East at the Brookings Institution - published his book in 2002 on the 
coming war against Iraq, arguing that the US ought to go to war against Saddam 
Hussein because it was too big a threat to be left unchallenged and that US victory 
would create a new balance of power that would be favourable to US interests.85 
Retrospectively, Pollack’s future – mostly the part on the consequences of toppling 
Hussein – can be easily challenged by facts.
Pollack did not suffer from making a hasty scenario that could have been ques-
tioned in terms of truthfulness (and also in terms of truth as regards the WMD). His 
reputation was not hurt and his peer group did not sanction him. The media did not 
sanction him either. On the contrary, Pollack was praised for having addressed pub-
licly what were considered his errors in an interview that he released once it became 
clear that that there were no WMD to be found in Iraq and that the consequences of 
the war were less positive than what could have been assumed before the interven-
tion.86 Pollack continues to be seen as a very prominent expert, widely quoted and 
has released numerous publications after the intervention, including two edited vol-
umes in 2011, one on Iraq and the other on the future of the Arab World.87 88 Unlike 
other markets where producers want to differentiate themselves based on the quality 
of their goods, DC’s marketplace gathers entrepreneurs who share a deep sense of 
solidarity. They are aware that an attack against one of their members (either an 
expert or the organisation he or she belongs to) would put into question their own 
method, their work and their ethos.89
Normative pressures and groupthink
The think tanks’ community is an interesting illustration of ‘groupthink’.90 Although 
think tanks gather more people than the small circles studied by Janis did and gather 
professionals that are not necessarily in direct contact with each other, some of the 
groupthink criteria pointed out by Janis apply to security expertise.91
Norms both from the ingroup and the outgroup are the major driving force of 
this groupthink. Among security experts, there is a prevailing belief in the rectitude 
of the group’s norms (one of Janis’ criteria). The experts’ findings are formatted in a 
common narrative as indeed these scenarios all refer to the pursuit of the US nation-
al interest. This creates strong normative pressure that is rarely questioned publicly 
within the group. An interesting example is the case of the studies on the Middle 
East.92 During the 2000s, ‘upgraded authoritarianism’, a term coined by an expert 
85 Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm (New York: Random House, 2002).
86 Kenneth Pollack, ‘Interview: Weapons of Misperception’, The Atlantic Monthly, January 13th 2004.
87  Kenneth Pollack, Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, February 2011); Kenneth Pollack, The Arab Awakening: America and the Trans-
formation of the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, November 2011).
88  ‘Publish or Perish’ indicates there is no significant change between the average yearly number of quotes of 
Kenneth Pollack’s work before the Iraq war (1998–2002) and after (2004–2011).
89  Large think tanks and their experts are comparable to financial rating agencies, as ratings about the creditwor-
thiness of states or companies are also claims about the future. In some cases, these accounts proved to lack 
truthfulness. However, this did not hurt the rating agencies’ reputation. Frank Partnoy, ‘The Paradox of Credit 
Ratings’, University of San Diego, Law and Economics Research Paper, 2001, No. 20.
90 Irving Janis, op. cit.
91 Ibid., p. 197.
92  For an excellent account of the community of Middle East experts’ shortcomings, see Gregory Gause, ‘Why 
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from Brookings was one of the pivotal concepts in the public debate on the Middle 
East.93 In his paper, Heydemann’s purpose was to challenge Wilsonianism and its 
emphasis on the promotion of democracy, because of the damage it causes to the US 
national interest. This vision is primarily inspired by a normative account (in this 
case Realism) that orients factual and future-oriented analysis. The explanatory and 
the normative overlap: Arab authoritarian regimes will not fall and the US should not 
try to encourage democracy. Moreover, as it is important to make the case for Real-
ism against Idealism, it is also important to show the stability of authoritarianism. In 
this context, the uprising against authoritarian regimes in countries such as Tunisia, 
Libya, Syria, Yemen or Egypt came as a surprise.
As in Janis’ model, stereotypical views of enemy leaders and more generally 
of what and who is the enemy are predominant. This implies strong normative and 
moral pressures exerted on the experts’ community and that orient consensus. Dur-
ing the times of the Cold War, it was difficult to make public claims about the fall of 
the Soviet Union due to its fragility.94 Such opinions were the exception, one of the 
main reasons was that they were morally criticised by those who considered that they 
underestimated the threat from the Soviet Union and were, as such, irresponsible and 
unpatriotic.95
Other criteria used by Janis to define groupthink are particularly relevant in the 
case of think tanks. Self-censorship applies because experts know that expressing di-
vergent views will make it less likely they will be heard. Traditionally, most of them 
will be co-opted and participate to an already existing debate and will try to develop 
an argument that differs only slightly from the already prevailing opinion.
CONCLUSION: THE PREFERENCE FOR BLINDNESS
Future claims are intermediate public goods that are produced in an epistemically 
imperfect marketplace of ideas and are not only about the future. It is indeed difficult 
to anticipate the future and notably to formalise change.96 However, neither experts 
nor policy makers have shown a great willingness to encourage innovation on the 
DC’s marketplace future market.97 When new issues emerge that were not part of the 
think tanks’ horizon scan or when ruptures happen, these facts are all the more likely 
to create surprises. Think tanks’ conformism and lack of innovation are the reflection 
Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: the Myth of Authoritarian Stability’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, 
No. 4, pp. 81–90.
93  S. Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World, (Washington D.C.: The Saban Center for 
Middle East Policy, Brookings, No. 13, 2007).
94  I have interviewed several former Sovietologists who underlined this particularity of their field. For an exam-
ple of an isolated voice that provided a truthful account of the future of the Soviet Union, see Karl Deutsch, 
‘Cracks in the Monolith Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems’, in Carl Friedrich 
(ed.), Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1954), pp. 308–333.
95  See Jeane Kirpatrick’s reaction to what she referred to as ‘liberal masochism’ when some tried to challenge the 
belief in the longevity of the Soviet Union. Jeane Kirkpatrick, ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’, Commen-
tary, Vol. 68, No. 5 (1979), p. 45.
96 Nicolas Rescher, op. cit.
97  The limitation of expertise in future claims is well established and publicly addressed. Philip Tetlock, op. cit. 
Interestingly, although both policy and expertise are aware of these methods, there has been a lack of support 
for predictive markets or alternative tools and methods to expertise based qualitative scenarios.
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of their aversion to change that is expressed in two ways. Firstly, they do not fore-
see structural changes in international politics and are subject to ‘omission bias’.98 
Secondly, the level of tolerance in the face of errors and untruthful claims is high 
within the community (section 4).
We see here a contrast between the epistemic futility of the future and its social 
utility. Experts need to create a collective and circular web of meaning that ties them 
together with their audience in DC’s social fabric. The future plays a pivotal role in 
this dynamic. It reflects in the common ethos experts share (section 1 and 4), in their 
language when they make anticipations (section 2), in the information they produce 
and their collective thinking (section 2), in their education (section 3) and in the 
norms by which they abide (section 4).
This mechanism helps create surprises although, in principle, anticipations 
should be instrumental in protecting the political community to which they are ad-
dressed from unexpected changes. Yet, this negative consequence does not seem to 
outweigh the benefits of the integrative functions of self-blinding prophecies.
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